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Bad “Leaker” or Good 
“Whistleblower”?—A Test 
“[T]he fundamental cause of leaks is a sense of illegitimacy that 
is bred by excessive government secrecy. How do you address 
that? You reduce the secrecy. How do you deal with the 
legitimacy problem? You make sure as few secrets as possible are 
actually held and you protect those very strongly.” 1 
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Introduction 
On August 21, 2013, Private First Class Bradley Manning2 was 
sentenced to thirty-five years for providing classified material to 
WikiLeaks, an online news organization.3 Although Manning shared  
1.  Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by 
WikiLeaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
76 (2010) [hereinafter Espionage Act Hearing] (statement of Thomas S. 
Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington 
University). Blanton further stated, “I would say leave the Espionage 
Act back in mothballs where it is right now and should stay. . . . Don’t 
mess with it. Leave it alone.” Id. 
2. The author acknowledges that Bradley Manning has asked to be called 
Chelsea Manning, but, to avoid confusion, this Comment will use only 
the male name and pronoun. “I Am Chelsea” Read Manning’s Full 
Statement, Today (Aug. 22, 2013, 7:35AM), http://www.today.com/
news/i-am-chelsea-read-mannings-full-statement-6C10974052. 
3. Dion Nissenbaum, Leaker Manning Gets 35 Years, Wall St. J., 
Aug. 22, 2013, at A6. 
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information with only the media, the Army eventually charged him 
with “[a]iding the enemy,” alleging that he “knowingly [gave] 
intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.”4 A conviction for 
aiding the enemy carries a possible death sentence, although the 
prosecution in Manning’s case sought merely a life sentence.5 The 
charges against Manning for “willfully communicat[ing] . . . or 
caus[ing] to be communicated . . . information, to a person not entitled 
to receive it”6 find their roots in the Espionage Act of 19177—a 
criminal statute historically “reserved for the treasonous act of giving 
secret information to an enemy.”8 Under the Obama administration, 
seven other individuals have been similarly charged, more than all 
previous administrations combined.9 
 
4. Bradley E. Manning Additional Charge Sheet, U.S. Army 1 (Mar. 1, 
2011) [hereinafter Manning Additional Charge Sheet]. Specifically, 
Manning was charged with violating article 104 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). Id.  
5. Floyd Abrams & Yochai Benkler, Op-Ed., Death to Whistleblowers?, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2013, at A35; § 904 (providing a violator “shall 
suffer death or other such punishment”). 
6. Continuation Sheet to Manning Additional Charge Sheet, supra 
note 4, at 1–5 (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Manning Amended 
Continuation Sheet]. Listed as specifications for offenses under article 
134 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012), the Army alleged several 
instances in which Manning violated civilian criminal code provisions, 
including 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). Id.; Continuation Sheet to Bradley E. 
Manning Charge Sheet, U.S. Army 1 (July 05, 2010). 
7. Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–
794, 2388 (2006)). Specifically, Manning’s charges under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 793(e) stem from section 1(d) of the Espionage Act. § 1(d), 40 Stat. at 
218 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006)).  
8. Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The 
National Security Dilemma, 16 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 51, 75–76 
(2012); see also Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage 
Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 
929 (1973) (recounting the legislative evolution of the “espionage 
statutes,” particularly 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794, from their predecessor 
provisions in the 1917 Act). 
9. David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? 
National Security and Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 
48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 473, 492 (2013) (listing five individuals 
other than Manning: Thomas Drake, John Kiriakou, Shamai 
Leibowitz, Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, and Jeffrey Sterling); Aubrey 
Bloomfield, 8 Whistleblowers Charged with Violating the Espionage Act 
Under Obama, PolicyMic (June 23, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/
articles/50459/8-whistleblowers-charged-with-violating-the-espionage-
act-under-obama (naming, among others, James Hitselberger and 
Edward Snowden). For detailed discussion of Snowden, Drake, 
Leibowitz, and Hitselberger, see infra Part I.B–C. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
Bad “Leaker” or Good “Whistleblower”? 
695 
Because previous administrations rarely used the Espionage Act10 
to prosecute individuals who leaked classified information to the 
media, the statute has faced only sparing judicial review11 and allows 
for strict prosecution of seemingly legitimate whistleblowers.12 
This Comment proposes an amendment to the Espionage Act to 
reflect the distinction between bad “leaks” and good “whistleblowing.” 
Bad leaks actually harm the nation’s defense capabilities or assist its 
enemies, while good whistleblowing reveals government fraud and 
abuse and tends to strengthen the public’s faith in government. 
Accordingly, whistleblowing, even in the context of national security, 
or maybe especially in the context of national security, should be 
afforded greater protection. Further, whistleblowers should be 
immune from criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act when 
disclosing government misconduct to the media because the statutory 
provisions require that the information actually be “used to the injury 
of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”13  
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights the 
increasing frequency of whistleblowing in the national security 
context. Part II discusses the evolving nature of government 
whistleblowing and the factors that demonstrate the need for greater 
protection. Part III proposes a new factor-based balancing test to 
determine when criminal sanctions are appropriate. Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the Manning case under the proposed factors and concludes 
that Bradley Manning’s criminal prosecution was unnecessary and 
overly severe. 
I. Leaks of Classified Information Are on the Rise 
The Obama administration has taken a severe stance toward 
leakers when the disclosed information involves national defense.14  
10.  Chapter 37 of the U.S. Code, titled “Espionage and Censorship,” 
includes additional sections not added by the 1917 Act. See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 795–799 (2006). This Comment refers to the sections in 
chapter 37 (§§ 792–799) collectively as the “Espionage Act.” 
11. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 (E.D. Va. 2006), 
(stating that while “[18 U.S.C. §] 793’s litigation history is sparse,” the 
statute has survived “challenges on both vagueness and First 
Amendment grounds”). 
12. See Connor Friedersdorf, The Obama Administration’s Whistleblower 
Problem, Atlantic (June 30, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2011/06/the-obama-administrations-whistleblowerproblem
/241262/ (detailing the Obama administration’s “tattered reputation” on 
the subject of prosecuting whistleblowers). 
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a), (d)–(e), 794(a) (2006). 
14. See Friedersdorf, supra note 12 (describing the Obama administration’s 
heavy-handed prosecution of several leakers and its efforts to get New 
York Times reporter James Risen to reveal his sources). 
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Some recent examples help outline the nature of the problem: When is 
a leak of classified material harmful to the United States, and when is 
it actually beneficial? 
A. Bradley Manning, WikiLeaks, and the State Department Cables 
By the end of 2010, Bradley Manning provided hundreds of 
thousands of classified U.S. government documents to WikiLeaks.15 
WikiLeaks posted the documents on its website and shared them with 
other news organizations like The New York Times and The Guardian 
newspapers.16  
The scope of Manning’s disclosure was enormous. Based on the 
information Manning provided, WikiLeaks “released more than 
700,000 sensitive or classified documents about U.S. military and 
diplomatic activity—92,000 on the war in Afghanistan, 392,000 on the 
Iraq war, and [as of December 1, 2010] nearly 250,000 diplomatic 
cables . . . .”17 While the court ultimately found Manning not guilty of 
aiding the enemy, he was convicted of violating the Espionage Act 
and faced a potential ninety-year imprisonment.18  
One of the most controversial items disclosed was a video of a 
2007 U.S. airstrike that killed about a dozen people, including two 
Reuters journalists.19 Reuters described the event as follows: 
[T]he helicopter mistook a camera for a rocket-propelled grenade 
launcher. The helicopter opened fire on the small group, killing 
several people and wounding others. Minutes later, when a van 
approached and began trying to assist the wounded, the fliers 
became concerned the vehicle was occupied by militants trying 
to collect weapons and help wounded comrades escape. The 
Apache helicopters requested permission to attack the van and 
waited impatiently. “Come on, let us shoot,” said one voice. The 
fliers were granted permission to engage the van and opened 
fire, apparently killing several people in and around the vehicle. 
Two children wounded in the van were evacuated by U.S. 
ground forces arriving at the scene as the Apache helicopters 
 
15. Brad Knickerbocker, WikiLeaks 101: Five Questions About Who Did 
What and When, Christian Sci. Monitor, (Dec. 1, 2010, 11:42 AM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1201/WikiLeaks-101-Five-questi
ons-about-who-did-what-and-when/Who-is-responsible-for-the-leaks.  
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Nissenbaum, supra note 3. 
19. David Alexander & Phillip Stewart, Leaked U.S. Video Shows Deaths of 
Reuters’ Iraqi Staffers, Reuters (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2010/04/06/us-iraq-usa-journalists-idUSTRE6344FW20100406. 
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continued to circle overhead. “Well it’s their fault for bringing 
their kids into a battle,” one of the U.S. fliers said.20 
The video incited anger in people across the globe and spotlighted the 
realities of an unpopular war. The materials disclosed by Manning 
also “included details of torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners [and] 
secret civilian death counts,”21 further raising Americans’ suspicions 
about the U.S. military’s role in Iraq. 
While U.S. officials have claimed “the release of documents has 
made some nations more hesitant to share intelligence or work with 
the U.S.,”22 others have hailed Bradley Manning as a hero for 
revealing unethical and illegal military conduct.23 In the end, however, 
the government charged Manning with, among other things, violating 
Espionage Act provision 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).24 
B. Edward Snowden Reveals Secret Surveillance Programs  
Edward Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and National Security Agency (NSA) employee, leaked top-secret 
information that unveiled the “systematic surveillance of innocent 
citizens.”25 Snowden provided the information to The Guardian, which 
published articles revealing secret government surveillance programs, 
including the interception of U.S. and European telephone metadata 
and several Internet surveillance programs.26 As reported by The 
Washington Post, the U.S. government—operating under a broad 
interpretation of section 215 of the Patriot Act27—is “gathering 
 
20. Id. 
21. Knickerbocker, supra note 15. 
22. Julian E. Barnes, What Bradley Manning Leaked, Wall St. J. Blog 
(Aug. 21, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/21/
what-bradley-manning-leaked/. 
23. Daniel Ellsberg, Daniel Ellsberg: Edward Snowden is a Hero and We 
Need More Whistleblowers, Daily Beast (June 10, 2013, 7:12 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/10/daniel-ellsberg-edwa
rd-snowden-is-a-hero-and-we-need-more-whistleblowers.html. 
24. Manning Amended Continuation Sheet, supra note 6, at 1–5. 
25. Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden: “I’m Not Going to Hide,” 
Wash. Post, June 10, 2013, at A1. 
26. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Revealed: How US 
Secretly Collects Private Data From AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, Paltalk, Skype, Yahoo and YouTube, The Guardian, 
June 7, 2013, at 1 (detailing how the NSA’s PRISM program collects 
information from a number of different websites); Dan Roberts & 
Spencer Ackerman, US Admits Surveillance of Calls Has Gone on for 
Years, The Guardian, June 7, 2013, at 4 (describing the NSA’s large-
scale surveillance of telephone communications).  
27. Patriot Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1862 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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massive amounts of information that can give a detailed picture of 
people’s networks of associates and who they are communicating with, 
when and for how long.”28 Government officials claim that the 
information is necessary to thwart terrorist attacks.29 
Opinions on Snowden’s conduct are far from unanimous. While 
some would cite the government surveillance programs as prime 
examples of secret, illegal, and unethical government misconduct ripe 
for whistleblowing, others find the leak treasonous. Human Rights 
Watch “urge[d] the Obama administration not to prosecute Edward 
Snowden . . . until it is prepared to explain to the public, in as much 
detail as possible, what . . . concrete and specific harms to national 
security his disclosures have caused, and why they outweigh the 
public’s right to know.”30 Former President Jimmy Carter supports 
Snowden’s revelations because, due to a lack of transparency, 
“America does not have a functioning democracy at this point in 
time.”31 Other high-ranking politicians, however, have accused 
Snowden of treason and Senator Lindsey Graham even said that he 
should be tracked “to the ends of the earth.”32 Given its divisive 
nature, it’s not surprising that courts also struggle with the issue. 
As of January 2014, Snowden remains a fugitive, living in Russia 
after being granted one-year temporary asylum on July 31, 2013.33 
C. Other Examples of Leaked Information Relating to National Security 
As mentioned, due to its active pursuit of whistleblowers, 
especially under the Espionage Act, the Obama administration has 
 
28. Ellen Nakashima, Report: Verizon Giving Call Data to NSA, Wash. 
Post, June 6, 2013, at A1. 
29. Id. 
30. US: Statement on Protection of Whistleblowers in Security Sector, 
Human Rights Watch (June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Human Rights 
Watch], http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/us-statement-protection-
whistleblowers-security-sector. 
31. Jack Kenny, Jimmy Carter Defends Snowden, Says U.S. Has No 
“Functioning Democracy,” New American (July 20, 2013, 6:45 PM), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/16043-jim
my-carter-defends-snowden-says-u-s-has-no-functioning-democracy. 
32. Id.; Jeff Poor, Lindsey Graham on Snowden: “I Hope We’ll Chase Him 
to the Ends of the Earth,” Daily Caller, (June 23, 2013, 3:38 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/23/lindsey-graham-on-snowden-i-hope-
well-chase-him-to-the-ends-of-the-earth/. 
33. Steven Lee Myers, In Shadows, Hints of a Life for Snowden, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2013, at A1; see also Michael J. de la Merced, 
Russia: Lawmaker Hints at New Offer for Snowden, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 25, 2014, at A8 (reporting that, according to one Russian 
lawmaker, Snowden may be permitted to stay beyond the initial 
expiration date of his temporary asylum). 
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gained a reputation for severity that contradicts the President’s 
campaign-trail dicta.34 Normally a champion of whistleblower rights, 
Obama departed markedly from this reputation with his position on 
national security leaks. Following is a list of three other people 
charged during Obama’s presidency, illustrating the increasing 
frequency of prosecutions for relatively low-level leaks concerning 
classified documents. 
1. Thomas Drake 
A former NSA executive, Thomas Drake was charged, among 
other things, under Espionage Act provision 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) for 
retaining top-secret documents and taking them home “for the 
purpose of ‘unauthorized disclosure.’”35 According to the government, 
Drake’s goal was to leak the government documents to a newspaper 
reporter, who subsequently published articles revealing “financial 
waste, bureaucratic dysfunction, and dubious legal practices in N.S.A. 
counterterrorism programs.”36 Shortly before trial, facing a potential 
thirty-five-year imprisonment, Drake pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor 
charge of exceeding his authorized use of a government computer, and 
the prosecution dropped all other charges.37 
As the judge noted, the government’s pursuit of charges under the 
Espionage Act, followed by a complete dismissal of those charges, 
conveyed an “extraordinary” message: 
I find it extraordinary in this case for an individual’s home to be 
searched in November 2007, for the government to have no 
explanation . . . for a two and a half year delay, for him to then 
be indicted in April of 2010, and then over a year later, on the 
eve of trial, in June of 2011, the government says whoops, we 
dropped the whole case.38 
2. Shamai Leibowitz 
In 2009, Shamai Leibowitz, a former linguist for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was charged under Espionage Act 
 
34. See Friedersdorf, supra note 12 (listing several whistleblowers who have 
been charged during Obama’s presidency and quoting then-candidate 
Obama, with regard to whistleblowers: “[T]heir acts of courage and 
patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer 
dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifled.’’). 
35. Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the 
State?, New Yorker, May 23, 2011, at 47, 47; Indictment at 1–10, 
United States v. Drake, No. 1:10-CR-00181-RDB (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2010). 
36. Id. 
37. Transcript of Proceedings: Sentencing at 32, United States v. Drake, 
No. 1:10-CR-000181-RDB (D. Md. July 15, 2011). 
38. Id. at 28.  
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provision 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) for disclosing classified documents to 
an unnamed blogger.39 While the United States alleged that Leibowitz 
leaked hundreds of pages of transcribed conversations that were 
secretly recorded by the FBI at the Israeli embassy in Washington, 
D.C.,40 not even the judge knew what was divulged—let alone how it 
might have harmed the United States or helped an enemy.41 
Leibowitz ultimately admitted to leaking five secret documents42 
and received a twenty-month prison sentence.43 At the time, the 
sentence “[was] likely to become the longest ever served by a 
government employee accused of passing national security secrets to a 
member of the media.”44 In just three years, Leibowitz has lost this 
distinction. Moreover, the judge had trouble deciding the impact of 
“sentencing disparity”—the process whereby a judge compares the 
proposed sentence to similar cases for consistency—“because there 
were so few other comparable cases to go by.”45 The current trend of 
regular, aggressive prosecution of whistleblowers may cure this 
problem. 
3. James Histelberger 
More recently, in 2012, another contract linguist, James 
Hitselberger, was also charged with violating Espionage Act provision 
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) for having “unlawfully retained national defense 
information,” specifically, classified reports with “sensitive 
information” about the activities of U.S. armed forces near Bahrain.46 
 
39. Information at 1, United States v. Leibowitz, No. AW-09-CR-0632 
(D. Md. Dec. 4, 2009). The blogger was later identified as Richard 
Silverstein. Bloomfield, supra note 9. However, Leibowitz has since 
claimed that Silverstein fabricated the story. Shamai Leibowitz, The 
Freedom to Ignore, Leibowitz Blog, (June 5, 2012), http://www.shamai
leibowitz.com/2012/06/freedom-to-act-and-freedom-to-ignore.html. 
40.  Scott Shane, Leak Offers Look at Efforts by U.S. to Spy on Israel, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 6, 2011, at A1. 
41. Maria Glod, Former FBI Employee Sentenced in Classified Leak, 
Wash. Post, May 25, 2010, at B3. 
42. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former FBI Contract Linguist Pleads 
Guilty to Leaking Classified Information to Blogger (Dec. 17, 2009). 
43. Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, Politico (May 25, 
2010, 4:44 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37721.html.  
44. Id. 
45. Steven Aftergood, Jail Sentence Imposed in Leak Case, Fed’n Am. 
Scientists (May 25, 2010), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2010/05/jail_leak/. 
46. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 1, United States v. 
Hitselberger, No. 1:12-CR-00231-RC (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2012) 
[hereinafter Hitselberger Complaint Affidavit]; Indictment at 1–3, 
United States v. Hitselberger, No. 1:12-CR-00231-RC (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 
2013) [hereinafter Hitselberger Indictment]. 
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Allegedly, Hitselberger printed several secret documents from a secure 
computer and donated them as a public collection to the Hoover 
Institute at Stanford University.47 
Unlike Manning, Snowden, Drake, and Leibowitz, however, there 
is no allegation that Hitselberger meant to give the information to the 
press or media. Instead, Hitselberger is being charged for willfully 
retaining documents relating to the national defense.48 According to 
court documents, officials found classified material in his backpack 
and in his private living quarters in Bahrain.49 
The important distinction between some other whistleblowers and 
Hitselberger is that, unless enemies of the United States are looking 
through the archives at the Hoover Institute, any potential injury to 
the nation is far less likely than when the information is published in 
a popular newspaper or on the Internet. Still, if convicted, 
Hitselberger faces up to thirty-nine years in prison.50  
II. The Increasing Need for a Clear Test 
Because government employees increasingly have access to more 
information, and more of that information is (mis)classified, the risk 
of facing criminal penalties and career-ending retaliation for any 
disclosure is higher than ever.51 As one U.S. Representative stated: 
“Indeed, while there’s agreement that sometimes secrecy is necessary, 
 
47. Hitselberger Complaint Affidavit, supra note 46, at 10–11. 
48. Id. at 1–2. 
49. Id. at 6–8. 
50. See Hitselberger Indictment, supra note 46, 1–3 (charging three counts of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), each of which carries a maximum sentence of 
ten years, and three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2071(a), each of which 
carries a maximum sentence of three years). As of November 2013, 
Hitselberger is challenging the § 793(e) as unconstitutionally vague. 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three of 
Superseding Indictment Because 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) Is Unconstitutionally 
Vague As Applied, United States v. Hitselberger, No. 1:12-CR-00231-RC 
(D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2013). Previous attempts to invalidate § 793(e) on 
vagueness grounds have failed. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 
1057, 1071–73 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the statute’s use of the term 
willful is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Drake, 
818 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915–22 (D. Md. 2011) (similarly ruling the terms of 
§ 793(e) are not unconstitutionally vague). 
51. Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to 
Reporter’s Privilege, 24 St. Thomas L. Rev. 399, 402–11 (2012) 
(emphasizing, among other things, that “the quantity of classified 
government material is massive today”).  
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the real problem today is not too little secrecy, but too much 
secrecy.”52  
According to some, the uptick in leak prosecutions is “consonant 
with other political shifts since 9/11” that have resulted in a “new 
security bureaucracy.”53 Thus, the prosecutions demonstrate a 
“normalization and legitimization of a national-surveillance state.”54 
Even if this statement is hyperbolic, the need to protect those who 
leak classified information in the course of revealing impingements 
upon citizens’ rights is evident. 
A. More and More Information is Overly Classified 
According to the U.S. government, as of October 2012, nearly 
5 million people had security clearances that allowed access to 
classified information.55 Of those, almost 1.5 million had access to 
“top secret” information.56 For fiscal year 2011, “[e]xecutive branch 
agencies reported [more than 92 million] derivative classification 
decisions,” a twenty percent increase from the prior year.57 Derivative 
classification occurs when people include material that has already 
been classified in a new format and make another classification 
decision based on the character of the new content.58 Because the 
means of electronic communication have expanded so rapidly, 
derivative classifications have sharply risen despite a concurrent drop 
in original classifications.59 But regardless of whether the 
 
52. Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers, Jr.) (“Recall the Pentagon papers case, Justice Potter Stewart 
put it, when everything is classified, nothing is classified.”). 
53. Mayer, supra note 35, at 48.  
54. Id. (quoting Professor Jack Balkin of Yale Law School). Balkin cites 
several other trends in support, noting specifically “the emergence of a 
vast new security bureaucracy, in which at least two and a half million 
people hold confidential, secret, or top-secret clearances; huge 
expenditures on electronic monitoring, along with a reinterpretation of 
the law in order to sanction it; and corporate partnerships with the 
government that have transformed the counterterrorism industry into a 
powerful lobbying force.” Id.  
55. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 2012 Report on 
Security Clearance Determinations 3 (2012). 
56. Id. 
57. Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2011 Report to the President 1 
(2012). 
58. Id. at 7. 
59. Id. at 4–5, 7. 
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classifications were original or derivative, the result is the same—the 
sheer volume of classified material is rapidly increasing.60 
Compounding the problem is the persistent overclassification of 
information.61 Much of this material and information classified by the 
U.S. government is undeserving of protection. And although many 
government officials are aware of the problem, little has been done to 
solve it.62 Some estimates show that as much as ninety percent of 
documents are wrongly classified.63 And while revealing classified 
material alone will not always result in an Espionage Act conviction, 
it can surely trigger charges, significantly increasing the government’s 
leverage when negotiating plea agreements with accused leakers. 
B. Complete Discretion Fosters Random Prosecutions That Destroy 
Fair Notice to Whistleblowers 
It used to be that whistleblowers could expect some level of safety 
from prosecution when disclosing questionable government conduct to 
the press.64 Consequently, many of the government’s most 
questionable policies were revealed by whistleblowers who leaked 
classified material. For example, whistleblowers have helped unveil 
the scope of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison,65 the CIA’s use of secret 
prisons to interrogate terrorism suspects,66 the use of waterboarding to 
torture suspects,67 and the warrantless wiretapping of Americans by 
the NSA.68  
60. See id. In fiscal year 2011, original classification decisions fell forty-three 
percent to 127,072, while derivative classifications rose twenty percent 
to 92,064,862. Id. 
61. McCraw & Gikow, supra note 9, at 486–87. 
62. Id. 
63. See Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Thomas S. 
Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington 
University) (referencing overclassification estimates). 
64. See McCraw & Gikow, supra note 9, at 473–74 (describing an unspoken 
bargain where “[l]eaks of government information took place, secrets 
were judiciously disclosed, national security was not obviously harmed, 
and the courts and Congress remained on the sidelines”). 
65. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, New Yorker, May 10, 
2004, at 42, 42–44. Alarmingly, the most severe sentence handed 
down to the abusers was ten years imprisonment. Abu Ghraib 
Torture and Prisoner Abuse, Martinfrost.ws, http://martinfrost.
ws/htmlfiles/abu_ghraib2.html, (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
66. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. 
Post, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. 
67. Brian Stelter, How ‘07 ABC Interview Tilted a Torture Debate, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 28, 2009, at A1. 
68. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
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While the government is progressively willing to pursue people 
like Private First Class Manning and Edward Snowden, it has been 
reluctant to prosecute high-level leakers who often reveal far more 
damaging material. The poster boy for administration-approved 
leaking is Bob Woodward, who in his book Obama’s Wars, revealed 
previously unknown CIA and NSA operations and their code names.69 
The information was considered so highly sensitive “that [Director of 
National Intelligence Mike] McConnell, under orders from President 
George W. Bush, barred [President-elect] Obama’s own transition 
chief, John Podesta, from sitting in at the briefing.”70 According to 
Woodward, “only those ‘designated to take a top national security 
cabinet post’ could attend” because the meeting would include 
discussions about highly classified “sources and methods.”71 Yet 
Woodward described the meeting in detail and neither Woodward nor 
any official present at the meeting was ever prosecuted for the brazen 
leak.72 
As one reporter put it: “At a time when the Obama 
administration is . . . prosecuting like never before government leakers 
of classified information, the Woodward book puts in a bad light the 
secrecy system that presidents can turn on or off at will, not always 
obviously in the national interest.”73 Instances like this—where the 
government flaunts its unfettered prosecutorial discretion—throw the 
system’s failures into sharp relief. 
III. A Proposed Test for Determining When to Apply 
Criminal Sanctions 
The rise in prosecutions for leaks of national defense information 
illustrates the need for Congressional action to amend the Espionage 
Act. Several other bodies that considered the issue agree. The 
Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information provide: “No person may be punished on 
national security grounds for disclosure of information if . . . the 
 
69. McCraw & Gikow, supra note 9, at 494 (citing Michael Isikoff, “Double 
Standard” in White House Leak Inquiries?, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 18, 
2010, 6:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39693850/ns/us_news-
security/t/double-standard-white-house-leak-inquiries/#.UjoOUrxgNN8). 
70. Id. (quoting Isikoff, supra note 69). 
71. Jack Goldsmith, Classified Information in Woodward’s “Obama’s 
Wars,” Lawfare (Sept. 29, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.co
m/2010/09/classified-information-in-woodwards-
obama%E2%80%99s-wars/. 
72. McCraw & Gikow, supra note 9, at 494.  
73. Goldsmith, supra note 71 (questioning why Woodward and his sources 
were never prosecuted for this disclosure by an administration that so 
aggressively asserts the “state secrets privilege” in courts). 
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public interest in knowing the information outweighs the harm from 
disclosure.”74 The Johannesburg Principles prohibit prosecutions when 
the “purpose or demonstrable effect is to protect interests unrelated 
to national security, including, for example, to protect a government 
from embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to conceal 
information about the functioning of its public institutions.”75 
Similarly, the recently released Tshwane Principles describe 
specific circumstances that would provide an accused leaker with a 
“public interest defence [sic].”76 Thus, even when someone discloses 
classified national defense information, they would still be immune 
from punishment or retaliation unless the harm outweighed the 
public’s interest.77 The Tshwane Principles list five factors to be 
considered by prosecutorial and judicial authorities, including: 
(i) whether the extent of the disclosure was reasonably 
necessary to disclose the information of public interest; 
(ii) the extent and risk of harm to the public interest caused by 
the disclosure;  
(iii) whether the person had reasonable grounds to believe that 
the disclosure would be in the public interest;  
(iv) whether the person attempted to make a protected 
disclosure through internal procedures and/or to an independent 
oversight body, and/or to the public . . . ; and  
(v) the existence of exigent circumstances justifying the 
disclosure.78 
Human Rights Watch recommends that prior to levying criminal 
charges against a whistleblower, “the U.S. government should be 
prepared to balance the actual harms threatened to national security 
against the public’s strong interest in revelation of wrongdoing,” 
 
74. Article 19, Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information, at princ. 15 (Nov. 1996). 
75. Id. at princ. 2(b). 
76. Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information: 
(“The Tshwane Principles”), at princ. 43 (June 12, 2013). The Tshwane 
Principles state that “(i) Criminal penalties should apply only to the 
disclosure of narrow categories of information that are clearly set forth 
in law; (ii) The disclosure should pose a real and identifiable risk of 
causing significant harm; (iii) Any criminal penalty, as set forth in law 
and as applied, should be proportional to the harm caused; and (iv) The 
person should be able to raise the public interest defence [sic].” Id. at 
princ. 46. 
77. Id. at princ. 43. 
78. Id. at princ. 43(b). 
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noting that “confidential government complaint mechanisms can be 
ineffective in the face of a pervasive regime of secrecy, high-level 
approval of the problem, or even bureaucratic inertia.”79 The 
organization suggests that the government use its discretion to refrain 
from prosecution “with a view towards protecting democratic 
oversight and preventing serious human rights abuses.”80 
But what factors should the prosecution consider in deciding 
when to prosecute and when to allow whistleblowers’ leaks of sensitive 
information that reveal wrongdoing? This Comment proposes a 
factor-based balancing test designed to weigh the information’s 
substantive news value against its significance to the military and 
national security. While many of these factors may already impact a 
judge’s or jury’s ultimate findings as to guilt or innocence, the 
important distinction is that these factors should be assessed by 
prosecutors before criminal charges are filed—especially when charges 
are brought under the Espionage Act and thus carry the risk of severe 
prison sentences. 
Factor 1: What is the information’s “primary” value? 
Is the information more useful to a citizen in a democratic 
republic? Or to opposing military forces (including cyber armies and 
terrorist organizations). A simpler way to ask these questions is: Is it 
news worthy? Or is it spy worthy? Most Americans would not be 
interested in the specific locations of military installations or an army 
platoon, but a spy would. Most Americans are, however, interested in 
whether their government is monitoring their Facebook activity, 
whereas a spy may be less so. 
Factor 2: Who received the information? 
Was the information given to a journalist or posted on the 
Internet? Or was it provided directly to another nation’s government 
or to known terrorist groups? When a whistleblower reveals sensitive 
information on the Internet, there is a possibility that enemies may 
benefit. But the more obvious result will be that everyone will benefit, 
and any benefit to the enemy will be outweighed by the widespread 
knowledge of the information. This benefit is further bolstered by the 
government’s understanding that what once was secret is now public. 
On the other hand, if the leaker gives the information to only a small 
group of people without intent to further publish or distribute the 
material, the likely inference is that only that group of people could 
benefit from the information, meaning no public good is achieved. 
 
79. Human Rights Watch, supra note 30. 
80. Id. 
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Factor 3: Is the information predictive? 
Did the whistleblower reveal past events, like a previous drone 
strike or instances of illegal surveillance? Or did the information 
reveal details about future events, such as planned military 
deployments or upcoming covert operations? If the disclosed material 
lacks any information that may be used to counter potential 
government intelligence efforts, then the threat of injury to the 
United States is slim, if not unfounded.  
Factor 4: Was the information properly classified? 
Even if the information is classified as top secret, there is at least 
a substantial chance, if not a likelihood, that the classification 
overstates the information’s threat to the United States. If the 
information is unclassified, there should be a presumption that it is 
public knowledge, and criminal charges should only be used for the 
most egregious and obvious cases. The proper level of classification is 
important because the classification level is selected based on the 
potential threat to the United States. Thus, if the material is 
incorrectly classified as top secret, the balancing test will be unfairly 
shifted in the government’s favor. 
Factor 5: Was the information filtered prior to disclosure? 
If the whistleblower screens the material and chooses not to reveal 
everything in their possession, it is more likely that their intent was 
to prevent as much harm as possible while still uncovering illegal or 
unethical actions. Although this factor would shed little light on the 
potential harm resulting from what was actually revealed, it may help 
illuminate the whistleblower’s intent and help tip the scale. 
IV. Bradley Manning’s Case Analyzed Under the 
Proposed Test 
The application of these factors to Bradley Manning’s case 
demonstrates the government’s overly harsh prosecutorial tactics and 
frames Manning as a whistleblower, not a leaker. 
Factor 1: What is the information’s “primary” value? 
The primary value of the information leaked by Manning is 
difficult to assess due to its sheer volume, but the most impactful 
information revealed severe human rights violations by the United 
States, such as prisoner abuse and civilian deaths attributable to the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.81 While much of the leaked information 
 
81.  See supra Part I.A. 
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may reflect poorly upon the United States politically, nothing has 
been shown to have actually aided the enemy. 
In Manning’s case, the government argued that the WikiLeaks 
documents “helped al Qaeda’s recruiting efforts” by illustrating the 
United States’ disregard for human life, referencing the helicopter 
attack of civilian journalists.82 But this type of attack is precisely the 
type of human rights violation that should be exposed by 
whistleblowers and are vital for basic government accountability. This 
information is far more “newsworthy” than “spy worthy” and any 
“aid” flowing to al Qaeda via the United States’ disregard for civilian 
life during war cannot be pinned on Manning but on the United 
States military. 
Factor 2: Who received the information? 
Manning disclosed the classified information to WikiLeaks—an 
organization dedicated to promoting transparency—that later posted 
the documents on its website and shared them with The Guardian 
and The New York Times. Manning did not give any classified 
information directly to any foreign national, foreign government, or 
known enemy of the United States. Manning’s disclosures were 
intended to benefit the public—to inform people around the world 
about what their governments are doing—and not to provide a 
specific nation or group with any strategic advantage. 
Factor 3: Is the information predictive? 
The information disclosed by Manning was not predictive in 
nature but rather recitals of past events and diplomatic cables, none 
of which were “top secret” and many of which were redacted prior to 
publication.83 The documents certainly conveyed sensitive information 
and may have jeopardized the United States’ political position in 
many regions, but nothing revealed specific missions, dates, times, 
plans, blueprints, or technology that could be used against the United 
States by its enemies. The most damaging information was contained 
in the video footage from a helicopter attack that occurred in 2007, 
three years prior to any disclosure by Manning. But by revealing only 
 
82.  Tom Ramstack, Reuters, U.S. Soldier WikiLeaks Breach Helped al 
Qaeda Recruiting-Witness (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2013/08/12/usa-wikileaks-manning-idUSL2N0GD11O20130812. 
83.  Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look 
Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (“[Of the 
251,287 cables], [m]any are unclassified, and none are marked ‘top 
secret,’ the government’s most secure communications status. But some 
11,000 are classified ‘secret,’ 9,000 are labeled ‘noforn,’ shorthand for 
material considered too delicate to be shared with any foreign 
government, and 4,000 are designated both secret and noforn.”). 
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past events, Manning minimized the information’s value to enemies of 
the United States and promoted healthy public debate about the 
government’s practices and policies. 
Factor 4: Was the information properly classified? 
In Manning’s case, none of the information leaked was classified 
as “top secret,” and many of the cables were not classified at all.84 
The government would point out that 24,000 cables were classified as 
“‘noforn,’ shorthand for material considered too delicate to be shared 
with any foreign government,” “secret” or both.85 Yet because none of 
the leaked documents met the high threshold of “top secret,” 
disclosure should not trigger charges for “aiding the enemy” and the 
threat of the death penalty. Such a disproportionate response sends a 
message that any information—even that which does not reach the 
level of “top secret”—is more valuable than the life of a soldier. 
Surely information whose disclosure could trigger such harsh 
repercussions should be classified at a higher level like “top secret.” 
Factor 5: Was the information filtered prior to disclosure? 
Manning shared hundreds of thousands of documents with 
WikiLeaks, making any meaningful postdownload censorship by 
Manning unlikely. But what Manning chose not to download from 
Army computers is a type of filtering process itself. Manning took no 
“top secret” information, demonstrating a choice to protect the 
nation’s most sensitive information. Further, by working with 
WikiLeaks—which coordinated with reputable newspapers throughout 
the world to protect sensitive information prior to publication86— 
Manning made a distinct effort to minimize the harm to the United 
States while maintaining the benefit of public disclosure. 
 
Thus, all five factors militate towards Manning’s position as a 
“good” whistleblower, revealing government abuses and questionable, 
if not illegal, practices and policies. Because Manning’s disclosures 
were more newsworthy than spy worthy, the government should have 
refrained from charging Manning with aiding the enemy and unfairly 
leveraging the possible prison sentences. 
 
84. Id.  
85.  Id.; see supra note 83. 
86.  James Ball, Unredacted US Embassy Cables Available Online After 
WikiLeaks Breach, The Guardian, Aug. 31, 2011. 
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Conclusion 
Open access to information is necessary to protect against abuse 
by public officials and to encourage citizens to exercise their rights 
and help shape the policies that govern their lives. Still, legitimate 
security interests require that some information remain beyond the 
public’s reach. But bare claims of national security cannot be used to 
justify unethical and illegal conduct. Thus, the Espionage Act should 
be amended to include a factor-based balancing test to guide 
prosecutors in determining when ever-serious charges under the 
Espionage Age are appropriate.  
To close, Justice Jackson’s warning regarding Congress’s “war 
power” deserves repeating here:  
No one will question that this power is the most dangerous one 
to free government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually 
is invoked in haste and excitement when calm legislative 
consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is 
executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation 
unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges under 
the influence of the same passions and pressures. Always, as in 
this case, the Government urges hasty decision to forestall some 
emergency or serve some purpose and pleads that paralysis will 
result if its claims to power are denied or their confirmation 
delayed.87 
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